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Abstract: This paper aims to reveal the relationship between cooperation, trust, and sustainability,
and to uncover whether cooperation, trust, and sustainability is nested within collaboration in
shipper–shipping company relationships. Structural equation modeling identified that cooperation
has a positive effect on trust, which partially mediates the impact of cooperation on sustainability.
Sub-constructs of cooperation included transparency, fairness, and mutuality. Fairness is the prime
antecedent of trust, and developing fairness can create more effective and high-quality relationships
among firms. A fuller theoretical model reveals how inter-firm cooperation may progress to
collaboration, and why transparency does not necessarily lead to trust.
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1. Introduction
Globalization created great uncertainty as traditional supply chain relationships involving
cooperation, collaboration, and competition between firms transformed into internecine competition
between supply chains [1,2]. In response, if inter-firm collaboration can resolve distorted demand
information, which generates bullwhip effects, collaboration may offer competitive advantages [3]. The
benefits of collaborative relationships include risk sharing, the acquisition of complementary resources,
reduced transaction costs, improved productivity, and enhanced performance [4]. Collaboration can
also create opportunities for firms to reduce the inherent costs of exploiting and monitoring new
markets, and avoid the risks of having to internalize non-core activities.
In the summer of 2016, financial difficulties forced Hanjin Shipping Company to cease trading,
causing $120 million in losses for 329 shippers and severely impacting other supply chain members
through delivery delays and broken contracts. Later, shippers wasted resources on searching for
alternative shipping transport service providers and endured rising freight rates [5], illustrating how
supply chain partners benefit from cooperating and collaborating with vulnerable partners.
Definitions of collaboration vary [6], but most emphasize process integration and sometimes
extend beyond inter-firm transactions [7]. Collaboration is rarely differentiated from cooperation,
inviting examination of the constructs involved. Accordingly, this research aims to conceptualize
inter-firm collaboration more comprehensively as viewed through alternative philosophical lenses
that differentiate collaboration from cooperation. The relationship between shippers and shipping
companies provides a case study of inter-firm cooperation and collaboration. The literature examining
the diverse collaborative relationships between potential shippers spanning suppliers, manufacturers,
distributers, retailers, exporters, and importers is sparse, offering a propitious research opportunity.
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2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
2.1. Some Theoretical Perspectives
Inter-firm cooperation and collaboration may be viewed through theoretical lenses, which include
transaction cost theory (TCT), resource-based theory (RBT), resource dependency theory (RDT),
contingency theory (CT), social exchange theory (SET), and social capital theory (SCT) [1,7].
Primarily, TCT focuses on whether a transaction is performed more efficiently within one vertically
integrated firm, or by autonomous contractors governed by the market outside the firm [8]. Transaction
costs can arise from the specificity of assets, uncertainty, or transaction frequency, leading to market
failure, which favors vertical integration [9]. Inter-firm cooperative and collaborative relationships can
reduce transaction costs and increase transaction stability by reducing the opportunistic behavior of
partners [1].
A resource-based view “attempts to explain firm sustainable competitive advantage as stemming
from firm resources that are rare, valuable, hard or impossible to imitate or duplicate, and hard to
substitute” ([10], p. 96). RBT focuses on the resources and capabilities that are available within a
firm as a source of competitive advantage [11]. A firm’s resources include factors that it possesses or
governs, whereas capabilities include a firm’s capacity to utilize such tangible or intangible resources
effectively. If a firm’s intangible resources and capabilities include a cooperative and collaborative
network with other firms, RBT offers a theoretical basis for cooperation and collaboration. Relational
theory (RT) involves applications of RBT to inter-organizational relations [12] or a complementary
theory to RBT, which seeks the origin of competitive advantage from inter-firm networks [11].
According to RDT, because firms rely on exchanges with each other to acquire necessary resources,
uncertainty fosters cooperation between partners and creates dependence on the other party [13]. Only
with cooperation and support from partners can firms respond to market demand. RDT and RBT often
imply collaboration between firms to improve their performance [14].
CT proposes that the best way to manage an organization varies with the organizational
environment. A good ‘fit’ is attained when an organization performs well in its matching with an
environment [15], but business environments vary and moderate the relationship between organization
and performance. Within a fast-changing environment, collaboration between companies can enhance
‘fit’.
SET explores how the interactions of actors in an exchange process are influenced by rewards
and costs [16]. When actors compare the rewards and costs of an exchange procedure, they decide to
participate in the exchange and make relationships that can maximize benefits and minimize costs [17].
SET literature has identified inter-firm cooperative and collaborative exchange relationships including
justice, followed by trust and commitment [18].
Social capital implies “networks together with shared norms, values, and understandings that
facilitate cooperation within or among groups” ([19], p. 41). The likelihood of opportunism and
correspondingly expensive monitoring processes may be reduced by the high levels of trust that are
inherent in social capital, which consequently reduce transaction costs. Social capital may encourage
cooperative behavior and offer a kind of resource that a firm can mobilize [20].
2.2. Cooperation and Collaboration
Spekman et al. [21] introduced a step function to show a transition from open market negotiations
to cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. Cooperation is an incipient relationship that differs
from collaboration. Collaboration involves higher levels of trust and commitment. Golicic et al. [22]
proposed that collaboration is the highest level of inter-firm relationship. Cooperation involves less
trust, commitment, and mutual dependence, and is less active than collaboration. The extent of
trust and commitment discriminates between the three concepts. In this work, differences between
cooperation and collaboration depend on the existence of trust and sustainability. Sustainability
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is postulated to include commitment and long-term orientation. Coordination, cooperation, and
collaboration are not differentiated, because coordination is one form of cooperation [18].
2.3. Operational Definitions and Hypotheses Development
2.3.1. Cooperation
Cooperation is a transparent business partnership process in which partners work together
treating each partner justly and equally on the basis of mutuality for common goals and benefits.
Cooperation is a subset of collaboration that is comprised of transparency, fairness, and mutuality.
Collaboration involves a business partnership process in which partners aim to sustain a long-term
cooperative relationship based on trust. Sub-constructs of collaboration involve cooperation, trust, and
sustainability. Each sub-construct is derived from relevant literature on inter-firm cooperation and
collaboration. Cooperation is proposed as an antecedent of trust, rather than a consequence [23], hence:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Cooperation between partners has a positive effect on trust between them.
2.3.2. Transparency
Transparency implies the extent to which a partner has an open and transparent relationship,
involving concepts of information-sharing, communication, and formalization.
Information-sharing is an important component of cooperation and a primary form of
collaboration [24]. Realistic, up-to-date, and detailed information exchange can enhance the efficiency
and visibility of inter-firm relationships [25]. To enhance information-sharing between maritime
transport participants, as an example, the European Commission initiated a research project regarding
the e-Maritime Strategic Framework and Simulation based Validation (e-Mar) [26]. Collaborative
communication is more frequent, more bidirectional, uses better information modes, and has enhanced
indirect influences. Formalization is the degree to which manifest rules and procedures regulate
decision-making, and is integral to improved collaborative relationships [2]. Well-established
formalization can enhance the transparency between immediate parties. Information-sharing
underpins trust-building [27]. Hence, the proposition:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Transparency has a positive effect on trust between partners.
2.3.3. Fairness
Fairness signifies the extent to which one partner treats another fairly and justly, invoking concepts
of justice and reciprocity [28]. Fairness can be conceptualized within collaborative buyer–supplier
relationships and can affect cooperation levels between partners [1], but fairness is under-researched
in supply chains. Conventionally, procedural and distributive justice defined fairness [29]. Procedural
justice describes how fairly a firm and its personnel deal with a partner [28]. Distributive justice defines
how an equitable distribution is ensured between partners, is commensurate with their contributions,
and assures satisfactory levels of cooperation [30]. Since the development of trust between partners
requires justice in interactions [31], proposition three is:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Fairness has a positive effect on trust between partners.
2.3.4. Mutuality
Mutuality implies the extent to which a partner treats another partner as an equal business
partner and is willing to support the other partner on the basis of mutual understanding. Mutuality
involves exchange relationships between organizations [6] based on goal congruence, decision
synchronization, resource sharing, joint problem-solving, joint performance measurement, and joint
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knowledge creation. Goal congruence implies the degree to which partners perceive that the attainment
of their common objectives satisfies their respective objectives. Decision synchronization refers to the
degree to which partners engage in joint decision-making. Resource sharing signifies “the process of
leveraging capabilities and assets and investing in capabilities and assets with partners” ([7], p. 6620).
Problem-solving implies settling matters such as disagreements and conflicts between partners and
unexpected disasters [24]. Joint performance measurement is required to encourage suitable behaviors
and make effective collaboration possible [32]. Joint knowledge creation identifies the extent to which
partners understand better and react to markets and environments.
Mutuality embraces popularly identified components of cooperation or collaboration. Min et
al. [25] cited joint planning, joint problem-solving, joint performance measurement, and leveraging
resources and skills as instances of collaboration. Cao et al. [7] cited goal congruence, decision
synchronization, resource sharing, and joint knowledge creation as collaborative enablers. In this
study, these components are merged into mutuality, implying that collaboration may create trust [25]
and that:
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Mutuality has a positive effect on trust between partners.
2.3.5. Trust
Trust is the extent to which a partner can be trusted in terms of trustworthiness, good
faith, benevolence, and fulfillment of obligations. Credibility and honesty [33] or credibility and
benevolence [34] are components of trust. Credibility is a firm’s belief about the sincerity and the
fulfillment of the obligation of its partner [23]. Trust can contribute to decreasing transaction costs,
anxiety, and uncertainty between partners, and restrain a partner’s opportunistic behavior [35].
2.3.6. Sustainability
Sustainability implies the extent to which one partner continuously sustains and strengthens
its relationship with a partner, based on commitment and long-term orientation. Commitment is
“an implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity between exchange partners” ([31], p. 19).
A committed partner wants to continue a relationship and is content to work to maintain the
relationship [18]. Long-term orientation signifies a partner’s orientation or desire toward having a
long-term relationship with a particular partner, which is associated with an interest in both current and
future outcomes and accomplishing future goals [35]. The construction, maintenance, and enhancement
of long-term relationships with partners can lead to effective inter-firm relationships.
Concerning the relationship between trust and sustainability, a positive relationship between
trust and commitment is identified [36,37]. Since a partner’s commitment to a relationship can be
increased by incremented levels of trust [18], and trust is a primary element of establishing a long-term
orientation [35], it is proposed that:
Hypothesis 5 (H5). Trust has a positive effect on sustainability between partners.
Figure 1 summarizes the relationships between the components of collaboration and
corresponding hypotheses. Cooperation and its sub-constructs such as transparency, fairness, and
mutuality are proposed as influences on sustainability via the mediating variable, trust.
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Figure 1. Research model.
3. Methodology
1. Developing Measurement Scales
All of the measurement scales adopted seven-point Likert scales anchored by strongly disagree
(=1) and strongly agree (=7). An incipient list of 76 items compiled from the existing literature was
distributed to 11 industrial experts who were instructed to discard any items that were unclear or
inappropriate for describing shipping company–shipper relationships. Forty items remained to define
collaboration after removing all of the items on which over 70% of respondents agreed that deletion
was appropriate. Following content analysis to remove items that overlapped or implied similar intent,
24 items remained to define collaboration.
To clarify sub-constructs such as transparency, mutuality, and sustainability, two-round Q-sorting
to establish content adequacy and verify that the sub-constructs that existed engaged six public officers,
nine academics, and 10 practitioners in South Korea. Twenty-four items and five sub-constructs were
emailed to experts, who were asked to select the one sub-construct that was most closely connected
to each item. The second-round Q-sorting demonstrated an overwhelming 97% agreement rate and
verified that the sub-constructs definitely existed.
Pilot testing in June 2016 engaged 34 practitioners who were representative of Korea’s shipping
industry and highlighted only typographical changes. Empirical Cronbach measures of reliability
significantly >0.7 including transparency (0.925), fairness (0.919), mutuality (0.972), trust (0.960),
and sustainability (0.925) implied <8% probability of an asymptotic bias. Appendix A shows the
items selected.
3.2. Sample and Data Collection
The analysis and interpretation of data is complex in dyadic research, particularly given power
imbalances between parties. The shipping industry is highly competitive, and shippers typically
have more power i service supplier–customer relationships [37]. Within this environment, the usual
practice in relationship esearch of examin g one s de of the relationship was ado ted [38].
South Korea’s shipping industry offe s useful context within which t study inter-firm
cooperation and collaboration, h sting in 2016 79 M deadw ight nes of registered vessels. South
Korea also hosts six top liner shipping c mpanies. Large shippers nclude Samsung, H undai, and
L tte and globally, South Korea is the sixth largest steel producer, fifth largest steel consumer, four
larg st importer of iron ore, and fifth largest co sumer of coal [39].
In May 2016, South Korea hos ed 183 ocean-going and 723 coastal shipping companies [40]. The
Kor a Shi wners’ Association provided contact data for all of the ocean-going companies and 241
coastal shipping companies. An email questionnaire survey was distributed to senior employees in
shipping companies in July followed by two reminder emails and two reminder phone calls. Of the
174 responses, 167 were usable, excluding one with missing data and six that did not engage fully. A
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total response rate of 25.5% and active response rate of 39.0% [41] implied a representative sample
(Table 1).
Table 1. Demographic data for 167 respondents.
Variables Percentage
Type of shipping registered
Coastal shipping 46.7
Ocean-going shipping 53.3
Type of vessel
Container 9.6
Bulk carrier 39.5
Tanker 30.5
Others 20.4
Work experience
Less than five years 10.8
5–9 years 16.8
10–19 years 53.8
Over 20 years 18.6
Job title
Staff/Assistant manager 11.4
Manager/Deputy department manager 32.3
Department manager 34.7
(Senior) Director/Chief executive officer (CEO) 21.6
Number of employees
Fewer than 10 10.8
10–49 35.9
50–99 25.7
100–199 12.6
More than 200 15.0
Contract period
Less than one year 32.9
1–2 years 33.5
3–9 years 16.8
More than 10 years 16.8
Armstrong and Overton [42] reasoned that non-respondents are likely to mimic the responses
of late respondents, and tested for a non-response bias by comparing the central tendency of the
responses of early and late respondents. Applying this reasoning, independent samples t-tests for 24
item variables yielding no statistically significant differences at p < 0.05 between the first 30 and last 30
respondents imply that a non-response bias is unlikely.
3.3. Data Purification for Structural Equation Modeling
To purify the initial sample, an exploratory factor analysis of items with maximum likelihood
and direct oblimin using SPSS 23 identified two free-standing indicator variables: MUT2 and SUS1.
Hence, for measurement and structural models, 15 items for cooperation, and 22 items for collaboration
(Appendix A) were retained (see Table 2).
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for collaboration.
Number of Items Mean (Standard Deviation) Cronbach’s α
Transparency 4 4.13 (1.36) 0.920
Fairness 4 4.01 (1.41) 0.925
Mutuality 7 3.55 (1.43) 0.960
Trust 4 4.61 (1.23) 0.914
Sustainability 3 4.02 (1.38) 0.924
Using AMOS 22, SEM first tested the construct validity of a measurement model, before estimating
and testing a theoretical model.
3.4. Measurement Model
3.4.1. First-Order Factor Measurement Model for Cooperation
Convergent validity was examined using standardized factor loading, average variance extracted
(AVE), reliability, and model fit statistics. The overall model χ2 is 273.07 with 87 degrees of freedom (df)
and p = 0.000. However, χ2 goodness-of-fit statistics should be reported alongside one absolute and
one incremental fit index [43]. This sample of 167 observations suits standardized root mean residual
(SRMR) measures. The calculated SRMR (=0.039) is below 0.05, which is a conservative threshold [44],
and the TLI (=0.922) and CFI (=0.935) exceed 0.90, indicating a good model fit. All of the standardized
factor loadings and corresponding squared factor loadings exceed the critical thresholds of 0.7 and 0.5,
respectively. All of the factor loadings are statistically significant at p < 0.01; critical AVE thresholds of
0.5 are exceeded for all of the sub-construct factor loadings, and the criterion for adequate reliability
(0.7) is satisfied [43]. For all of the sub-constructs, reliabilities are acceptable, and Cronbach’s α exceeds
0.7, strongly implying a valid model (Table 3).
To establish the discriminant validity, the square roots of the AVEs for each factor and values
of inter-factor correlation associated with the factors were compared [43]. All of the square roots of
AVEs exceeded the corresponding pairwise correlation estimates among sub-constructs, implying no
problems regarding discriminant validity (Table 4).
Unidimensionality was supported by significant standardized regression weights >0.7, a good
model fit, and standardized residuals <2.58 [45].
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Table 3. Confirmatory factor analysis results for sub-constructs of cooperation.
Sub-Constructs Items Standardized RegressionWeight t-Value Squared Multiple Correlations Standard Error Construct Reliability AVE Cronbach’s α
Transparency TRA1 0.857 16.378 *** 0.734 0.055
TRA2 0.752 12.607 *** 0.566 0.063 0.921 0.745 0.920
TRA3 0.921 19.559 *** 0.849 0.049
TRA4 0.913 1 0.834 1
Fairness FAI1 0.759 13.031 *** 0.575 0.057
FAI2 0.818 15.136 *** 0.669 0.056 0.923 0.752 0.925
FAI3 0.962 23.062 *** 0.925 0.047
FAI4 0.916 1 0.84 1
Mutuality MUT1 0.864 16.969 *** 0.746 0.054
MUT3 0.795 14.18 *** 0.632 0.067
MUT4 0.852 16.422 *** 0.726 0.056
MUT5 0.946 21.795 *** 0.894 0.046 0.961 0.779 0.960
MUT6 0.939 21.323 *** 0.882 0.047
MUT7 0.864 16.999 *** 0.747 0.053
MUT8 0.907 1 0.823 1
Chi-square = 273.066, Degrees of freedom = 87, SRMR = 0.039, TLI = 0.922, CFI = 0.935
1 Not estimated because loading was fixed at 1.0, *** p < 0.01. AVE: average variance extracted.
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Table 4. Discriminant validity of the sub-constructs of cooperation.
Transparency Fairness Mutuality
Transparency 0.86 1
Fairness 0.84 *** 0.87 1
Mutuality 0.81 *** 0.84 *** 0.88 1
1 Square root of the AVE for each sub-construct, *** p < 0.01.
3.4.2. First-Order Factor Measurement Model for Collaboration
Additional sub-constructs of trust and sustainability were added in the measurement model for
collaboration. Convergent validity was strongly supported by goodness-of-fit indices (χ2 = 507.88,
df = 199; SRMR = 0.043; TLI = 0.914; CFI = 0.926), factor loading estimates (all >0.7, statistically
significant at p < 0.01), AVEs (0.746 to 0.814 > 0.5), construct reliabilities (0.914 to 0.961 >0.7), and
Cronbach’s α (0.914 to 0.960 >0.7) (Table 5).
Discriminant validity was supported (Table 6), and the evidence supported the unidimensionality
of this model with all of the standardized regression weights >0.7; this indicated a good model fit and
that all of the standardized residuals were within the recommended values.
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Table 5. Confirmatory factor analysis results for the sub-constructs of collaboration.
Sub-Constructs Items Standardized RegressionWeight t-Value Squared Multiple Correlations Standard Error Construct Reliability AVE Cronbach’s α
Transparency TRA1 0.857 16.398 *** 0.735 0.055
TRA2 0.754 12.651 *** 0.568 0.063 0.921 0.746 0.920
TRA3 0.920 19.493 *** 0.847 0.050
TRA4 0.913 1 0.833 1
Fairness FAI1 0.761 13.121 *** 0.578 0.057
FAI2 0.822 15.331 *** 0.675 0.055 0.924 0.754 0.925
FAI3 0.958 23.025 *** 0.917 0.047
FAI4 0.918 1 0.843 1
Mutuality MUT1 0.864 17.125 *** 0.747 0.053
MUT3 0.798 14.346 *** 0.636 0.066
MUT4 0.855 16.704 *** 0.732 0.056
MUT5 0.942 21.785 *** 0.887 0.046 0.961 0.779 0.960
MUT6 0.937 21.429 *** 0.878 0.047
MUT7 0.866 17.183 *** 0.749 0.052
MUT8 0.910 1 0.829 1
Trust TRU1 0.852 13.023 *** 0.725 0.079
TRU2 0.932 14.824 *** 0.868 0.077 0.914 0.780 0.914
TRU3 0.812 12.146 *** 0.659 0.079
TRU4 0.812 1 0.659 1
Sustainability SUS2 0.814 15.536 *** 0.662 0.053
SUS3 0.941 23.005 *** 0.885 0.040 0.929 0.814 0.924
SUS4 0.945 1 0.893 1
Chi-square = 507.879, Degrees of freedom (df) = 199, Standardized root mean residual (SRMR) = 0.043, TLI = 0.914, CFI = 0.926
1 Not estimated because loading was fixed at 1.0, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6. Discriminant validity of the sub-constructs of collaboration.
Transparency Fairness Mutuality Trust Sustainability
Transparency 0.864 1
Fairness 0.839 *** 0.868 1
Mutuality 0.810 *** 0.842 *** 0.883 1
Trust 0.681 *** 0.792 *** 0.774 *** 0.853 1
Sustainability 0.697 *** 0.762 *** 0.771 *** 0.762 *** 0.902 1
1 Square root of the AVE for each sub-construct, *** p < 0.01.
3.5. Validation of Second-Order Constructs
Specification of the second-order factor is justified by statistically significant estimates and a good
model fit. The efficiency of a second-order factor model can be assessed by the target (T) coefficient [46],
where 0.8 < T < 1.0 demonstrates the existence of a second-order construct [47] and the efficiency of
the second-order structure.
3.5.1. Second-Order Factor Measurement Model for Cooperation
Strong paths were statistically significant with p < 0.01. The second-order construct (cooperation)
explains respectively 81%, 87%, and 81% of the variation in the first-order factors of transparency,
fairness, and mutuality, and critical values of fit indices were fully satisfied (χ2 = 273.07, df = 87;
SRMR = 0.039; TLI = 0.922, CFI = 0.935). The T coefficient (=1.0), provided good evidence of the
existence of a higher order construct, i.e., cooperation. Relations between the first-order factors could
be completely explained in terms of the second-order factor [46].
3.5.2. Second-Order Factor Measurement Model for Collaboration
Estimates from the second-order factor (collaboration) to the first-order factors showed a
strong statistically significant relationship at p < 0.01, and collaboration explained respectively
76% (transparency), 86% (fairness), 85% (mutuality), 72% (trust), and 68% (sustainability) of the
variation. Model fit indices satisfied the recommended thresholds (χ2 = 525.28, df = 204; SRMR = 0.047;
TLI = 0.913, CFI = 0.923), and the T coefficient (= 0.967) indicated that the second-order construct exists
and the second factor model is efficient.
3.5.3. Common Method Bias
Organizations operating in multiple shipping sectors were offered one response per sector and
multiple responses comprised one-tenth of the total responses, reducing the risk of the common
method bias. Widaman’s [48] three-model comparison was also deployed (Table 7). Significant ∆χ2
statistics and improved model fit indices comparing models M0 and M2 indicated that the possibility
was minimized but impossible to eliminate, given the research design. Comparing models M0 with
M1 and M1 with M2 the significance difference identified convergent and discriminant validity [49].
Table 7. Comparison of fit of three models.
Null (M0) One factor (M1) Second-Order Factor (M2) M0–M1 M1–M2
Cooperation
χ2 2973.2 633.0 273.0 2340.2 *** 360.0 ***
df 105 90 87 15 3
SRMR 0.633 0.067 0.039 SI SI
TLI 0 0.779 0.922 SI SI
CFI 0 0.811 0.935 SI SI
Collaboration
χ2 4412.8 1228.1 525.2 3184.7 *** 702.9 ***
df 231 209 204 22 5
SRMR 0.607 0.069 0.047 SI SI
TLI 0 0.731 0.913 SI SI
CFI 0 0.756 0.923 SI SI
*** p < 0.01, SI: Significantly improved.
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3.6. Structural Model and Hypotheses Tests
3.6.1. Structural Model for Collaboration with First-Order Factors
The structural model provided evidence of a good model fit (χ2 = 535.186, df = 202; SRMR = 0.064;
TLI = 0.909, CFI = 0.920), with SRMR values ≤0.08 considered “acceptable” [50].
Hypotheses H3, H4, and H5 were supported by significant and positive path estimates (Table 8),
but because the dependence relationship of trust from transparency was not significant, H2 was
rejected. The overall predictive validity of this structural model was supported given that three paths
corresponded to the hypotheses, but one did not [43].
Table 8. Structural parameter estimates of first-order factors of collaboration.
Structural Relationship Standardized Regression Weight t-Value Accept/Reject
Transparency→ Trust (H2) −0.057 −0.521 Reject
Fairness→ Trust (H3) 0.501 4.047 *** Accept
Mutuality→ Trust (H4) 0.424 3.868 *** Accept
Trust→ Sustainability (H5) 0.793 10.987 *** Accept
Goodness-of-fit indices
χ2 = 535.186 (df = 202), SRMR = 0.064, TLI = 0.909, CFI = 0.920
*** p < 0.01.
3.6.2. Structural Model for Collaboration with Second-Order Factor
When the second-order construct, cooperation, was imposed to test Hypothesis H1 (Figure 2),
goodness-of-fit statistics (χ2 = 541.724, df = 204; SRMR = 0.065; TLI = 0.909; CFI = 0.910) were acceptable.
All of the regression weights were significant at p < 0.01, and a path coefficient of 0.86 (t-value = 10.22)
supported Hypothesis H1.
3.6.3. Test for Mediational Effects of Trust
The mediating role of trust was tested using Holmbeck’s [51] approach. First, the path (0.81)
directly linking cooperation to sustainability was significant at p < 0.01 (χ2 = 359.555, df = 131;
SRMR = 0.043; TLI = 0.923; CFI = 0.934). Second, two paths connecting cooperation to trust (0.86)
and trust to sustainability (0.79) were significant at p < 0.01 (χ2 = 541.724, df = 204; SRMR = 0.065;
TLI = 0.909; CFI = 0.919). Third, the direct path was added to the second model, and the direct
effect from cooperation to sustainability was reduced to 0.56 (χ2 = 518.276, df = 203; SRMR = 0.045;
TLI = 0.914; CFI = 0.925). A χ2 difference test between the second and third models was significant
at p < 0.01 (∆χ2 = 23.45, ∆df = 1), implying that trust partially mediated the relationship between
cooperation and sustainability.
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4. Discussion and Implications
4.1. Implications for Theory
This research developed more comprehensive models of inter-firm cooperation and collaboration
by synthesizing relevant theories and extending the theories underlying cooperation and collaboration
to the relationships between shipping companies and shippers. As an example, the essential
conceptions of SET such as fairness, trust, commitment, and long-term orientation were adapted
within supply chain contexts. Relationships among the concepts including fairness→ trust, and trust
→ commitment and long-term orientation were strongly supported.
A fuller definition of inter-firm cooperation and collaboration embraced philosophical aspects of
inter-firm relationships together with process integration. The extant literature highlighted incentive
alignment, particularly distributive justice, but this study introduces procedural justice within fairness.
Relationship strength consisting of trust and commitment [35] was extended to include a long-term
orientation involving sustainability.
Spekman et al. [22] and Golicic et al. [23] differentiated between cooperation and collaboration.
In this study, cooperation is nested within collaboration as a subset of collaboration, and the process
was demonstrated whereby cooperation can advance to collaboration i.e., cooperation → trust
→ sustainability.
This research identified transparency, fairness, and mutuality as dimensions of cooperation,
and by adding trust and sustainability, defined five dimensions of collaboration. The T coefficient
supported the existence of the second-order factors, viz. cooperation and collaboration. Differentiation
between cooperation and collaboration depends on the existence of trust and sustainability. Hence,
inter-firm cooperation is characterized as involving transparent, fair, and mutual relationships between
parties. Inter-firm cooperative relationships become collaborative or truly cooperative when based on
trust, commitment, and long-term orientation.
4.2. Implications for Managers
This research invites practitioners to identify and understand what constitutes inter-firm
cooperation and collaboration, extending beyond business integration (i.e., mutuality in this study) into
philosophical and cultural perspectives. The properties of cooperation and collaboration identified
underpin the building of truly cooperative and collaborative attitudes in engaging with supply
chain partners.
Significant and positive path estimates indicated that fairness and mutuality foster trust (H3
and H4), which subsequently leads to sustainability (H5). The greatest impact on trust belonged to
fairness (H3, path coefficient 0.50). The weaker partner considers fairness as the essential antecedent
of trust, supporting Kumar et al.’s [29] argument that a vulnerable party is sensitive to infringement
of fairness by more powerful partners. Dominant partners should endeavor to share profits and
burdens with weaker partners and ensure procedural fairness, in order to develop effective and
high-quality relationships.
Considering the mediating role of trust, an inter-firm cooperative relationship can be sustainable
in the long-term when based on trust. However, the process of building trust needs continuous
cooperative endeavors between partners [25]. Moreover, a weaker party is obliged to cooperate when
its powerful partners exert coercive power [1]. The stronger party should continuously develop and
implement substantive methods to draw sincere trust from vulnerable partners to enjoy long-term
benefits through cooperation, including higher quality and lower costs [4].
Hypothesis H2 (transparency→ trust) was rejected, but this finding is open to interpretation.
Reverse causality may be attained if trust can also positively influence higher levels of
information-sharing and quality [52]. Alternatively, exploratory modeling of the likelihood of the
causality between components of cooperation can be examined [43,44]. Models that added new
paths including transparency→ fairness and transparency→mutuality to the structural model for
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collaboration with first-order factors, and demonstrated an acceptable goodness-of-fit (χ2 = 566.543,
df = 204; SRMR = 0.075; TLI = 0.902; CFI = 0.913). Transparency simultaneously played an antecedent
role of both fairness and mutuality (path coefficients 0.87 and 0.84, respectively). Common sense
supports the view that transparency is fundamental to a cooperative relationship, and essential for
enhancing fairness and mutuality between partners. One expert commented: “ . . . powerful partners
tend to favor the simplest contract . . . additional requests . . . are inclined to be asked verbally . . .
[and] cannot be ignored in light of the partners’ superior status”. Simple agreements are clearly and
transparently understood, but can hinder trust-building, and frequent contact with a dominant partner
can burden weaker partners. Transparency does not necessarily lead to improved trust, but may
cause reductions where trust has not yet developed. After cooperation has been established through
transparency, fairness, and mutuality, trust can be fostered and enhanced by cooperation (H1). As for
H5 (Trust→ Sustainability), given that trust among the shippers and shipping companies can realize
the higher level of sustainability, the weaker members should also develop and implement methods to
foster trust from their influential supply chain partners. However, because building trust is not an easy
task, and trust has to be earned over time, shipping companies’ managers should prove continuously
and with patience that their promises are kept, and complicated expectation or needs of shippers are
met in daily interactions.
5. Conclusions
In this study, cooperation between firms directly affected trust and indirectly affected
sustainability, but the components of collaboration may further initiate a virtuous circle. As partners
come to trust each other, enhanced mutual cooperation is likely [25], and a long-term orientation
between partners often stimulates diverse cooperative behaviors [4], which invite further empirical
research. Besides, this cooperation behavior can be applied into other logistics areas such as last-mile
logistics, as Perboli et al. [53] notably suggested.
Research into alternative functional stances may offer interesting avenues for future research.
This paper reports the views of shipping service providers, but future work might investigate
how influential partners may hold differing opinions about how collaboratively they interact with
vulnerable partners, or how collaboration between weaker partners affects them.
Generalization of the model of inter-firm relationships that was presented depends on how closely
other research contexts mirror the conditions reported herein. Since each new inter-firm relationship
is distinctive, experts would need to re-examine each item carefully. This implies that conclusions
that joint demand forecasts and joint inventory management cannot be applied to the relationship
between shippers and shipping companies may not be attained elsewhere. Furthermore, this study
agrees that different views from one side can be derived from the other side. Albeit, the views of only
one side (shipping firms) were examined in this study. The potential challenges might result in the
common methods variance via the single informant design. The influential supply chain members
also have opinions on how collaboratively they are treating their weaker SC partners, as well as on the
collaboration levels of shipping companies toward them. To alleviate the concern about the assessment
of only shipping companies, future research needs to be conducted based on data from both sides.
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Appendix A. Measurement Items
1. Transparency (four items)
(1) Shippers exchange relevant and timely information with our firm (TRA1).
(2) Shippers and our firm communicate smoothly through channels such as regular or casual
meetings between executives or staff (TRA2).
(3) Shippers make communication with our firm open and two-way (TRA3).
(4) The cooperative and collaborative relationship between shippers and our firm is
understood clearly and transparently through prior agreements (TRA4).
2. Fairness (four items)
(1) Shippers do not discriminate against our firm compared with other shipping companies
(FAI1).
(2) Shippers try to comply with regulations related to business transactions, including
the standard form of contract and laws related to fair trade including the ‘Monopoly
Regulation and Fair Trade Act’ and ‘Fair Transactions in Subcontracting Act’ (FAI2).
(3) Shippers make an effort to guarantee reasonable and just profits for our firm (FAI3).
(4) Shippers make an effort to bear reasonably and justly any additional risks, burden, and
costs related to delivery with our firm (FAI4).
3. Mutuality (eight items)
(1) Overall, shippers understand our firm’s services well and are willing to provide any
necessary assistance (MUT1).
(2) Shippers are willing to share their facilities and equipment such as docks, cranes, and
delivery vehicles with our firm (if shippers have such facilities and equipment) (MUT2).*
(3) Shippers are willing to provide financial support such as bank loan guarantees, which
are required to procure vessels for our firm (if shippers have such financial capabilities)
(MUT3).
(4) Shippers are willing to assist our firm in overcoming difficulties when our firm is faced
with difficulties (MUT4).
(5) Shippers and our firm, as equal business partners, settle together common cooperative
and collaborative implementation plans or objectives (MUT5).
(6) Shippers and our firm, as equal business partners, decide together the availability level of
our facilities and equipment (MUT6).
(7) Shippers and our firm, as equal business partners, together identify customer needs
related to delivery and try to improve delivery quality jointly (MUT7).
(8) Shippers and our firm, as equal business partners, review together the performance of our
firm (MUT8).
4. Trust (four items)
(1) Overall, shippers are trustworthy (TRU1).
(2) We believe the good faith of shippers when it comes to the relationship between shippers
and our firm (TRU2).
(3) We believe that shippers fulfill their contractual obligations (TRU3).
(4) We believe that shippers benefit our firm (TRU4).
5. Sustainability (four items)
(1) The relationship between shippers and our firm is stable (SUS1) *.
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(2) The relationship between shippers and our firm will last and be strengthened over time
(SUS2).
(3) Shippers try to maintain their relationship with our firm, including developing new
business plans or ideas together (SUS3).
(4) Shippers try to enhance continuously their relationship with our firm, including expanding
jointly new markets (some overseas) (SUS4).
Note. * MUT2 and SUS1 were deleted following exploratory factory analysis.
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